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1. Introduction 
 
In a 1989 seminal paper published in Public Choice, Carole J. Uhlaner 
introduced the concept of relational goods within the rational choice theory2: 
These goods arise as a function of a relationship with others […] Relational 
goods can only be enjoyed if shared with some others […]. [Such goods] 
exist after appropriate joint actions have been taken by a person and non-
arbitrary others […] the others must either be specific individuals or drawn 
from some specific set. The identity of the “other” in relationship 
matters.(Uhlaner, 1989, p. 254, italics added) 
These goods are therefore the outcome of the “joint” behaviour/consumption of 
a subset characterized by a group identity within a given population. Unlike 
private goods, relational goods are thus neither produced nor consumed by only 
one individual, otherwise the condition of joint consumption with others would 
not be given; relational goods also differ from public goods in that they are neither 
produced nor consumed by the totality of the population, which would preclude 
their identifying character.  
Moreover, relational goods are characterized by an inverted rivalry or anti-
rivalry in terms of consumption because of the fact that positive consumption by 
an individual increases along with sharing. This feature distinguishes them both 
from private goods (which are rival) and from public goods (which are non-rival). 
 
Relational goods are not the only kind of goods characterized by joint 
consumption. As we will show in this essay, a further good – one closely related 
to relational goods – is characterized by joint consumption among individuals. 
The term “positional goods” (e.g. power, status, and prestige), introduced by Fred 
Hirsch in 1976, identifies those that are consumed for relative rather than absolute 
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value (see also Frank, 1985; McAdams, 1992; Schor, 1996; and Vatiero, 2009 and 
2010). As stated in a well-known example by Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), the 
Jones family’s choice of a new car will depend not only on whether it is big 
enough for their own needs, but also (if possible) on whether it is bigger than that 
of their neighbours. The issue of choice in consumption is not only a relation 
between producer and consumer, but also involves other consumers (and 
producers) in a manner similar to a status game (see Shubik, 1971).  
 
As a result, both relational and positional goods are based upon an idea of joint 
consumption, though with opposite signs. In the case of a relational good, positive 
consumption by an individual is positively related to the consumption of that good 
by other individuals; in the case of a positional good, positive consumption by an 
individual increases if the negative consumption of that good by other individuals 
increases at the same time3 (see Pagano 1999, 2007, and 2010). In both cases, the 
economic agents no longer exclusively consider themselves; their well-being and 
consumption choices also depend on the consumption of other individuals.  
 
Following the terminology of Leibenstein (1950), joint consumption of 
relational goods produces a bandwagon effect, whilst we can observe a snob effect 
in the case of positional goods. According to the concept of the bandwagon effect, 
demand for and consumption of a given good increase along with the 
consumption of that good by other individuals. The bandwagon effect represents 
“the desire of people to purchase a commodity in order to get into ‘the swim of 
things’; in order to conform with people they wish to be associated with; in order 
to appear to be ‘one of the boys’” (Leibenstein, 1950, p. 189). Emulation, which is 
at the basis of the bandwagon effect, is a relation form itself that determines the 
relational outcome, i.e. a quasi-rent enjoyed by individuals sharing in 
consumption with the same sign of the object of emulation. This stimulates 
demand and therefore consumption by other individuals of the object of 
emulation, turning it into a relational good. In the case of positional goods, on the 
contrary, we witness Leibenstein’s snob effect: “the desire of people to be 
exclusive; to be different; to dissociate themselves from the ‘common herd’” 
(Leibenstein, 1950, p. 189). Hence, the snob effect refers to situations in which an 
individual’s demand for a good is inversely related to overall demand for said 
good. In other words, individuals prefer to set themselves apart rather than 
emulate others.   
 
This note seeks to provide a joint examination of relational and positional 
goods, underlining the common aspect of sociality à la Uhlaner (1989). In 
particular, our thesis is that a close interconnection and dependence exist between 
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choices to consume relational and positional goods. Our explanation (though 
static) is therefore able to point out the theoretical connections between these two 
types of goods. It can also be supplemented by referring to the literature on 
cultural selection (see Boyd and Richerson, 2009 and 2010) and interdependence 
between competition and cooperation in economic evolution (see, among others, 
Bowles et al., 2010, § 2; and Bowles and Gintis, 2011, § 4-5).4 
 
The rest of the note is structured as follows: section 2 presents a simple model 
in terms of coalitional games of the two types of goods; section 3 discusses the 
role of identity in both relational and positional goods. In section 4,we investigate 
the role of property rights for both types of goods. Section 5 is dedicated to our 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Model 
 
Given a population Θ of  individuals with Θ = 1, … , , … , 	, we use 
 ⊂  
to indicate a subset or coalition of  individuals (from the whole Θ) in which 
individuals choose to share, with the same sign, the consumption of a good (or 
initiate a similar action), represented by . The superscript  indicates a relational 
good as defined by Uhlaner (1989). We also identify with  a function  →  
that given the anti-rivalry character (which is a condition of superadditivity) of the 
consumption of the relational good, v is an increasing function in k. If we indicate 
with > 0 the relational quasi-rent that develops among the individuals, the 
result is  <   for each  < . More generally, if the coalition composed of  
people is divided into two sub-coalitions, 
 and 
 , a good is relational if  
(1)                                            
 = 
 ∪ 
  +  
Where 
 ∩ 
 = 0 and ! + " = . 
The coalitional game 〈Θ; 〉 of a relational good thus associates a real number 
 with each non-empty coalition 
 of , such that 
(2)              
 = &∑ ()) − +)) +),  -. / ≤  ≤ /∑ ()) − +))), -.  < / ∨  > /2 
with ( and + respectively representing benefits and marginal costs with a positive 
consumption of  for the individual --th. If the good is purely relational, then ( = 0. In some definitions of relational goods, it is also assumed that they are free 
for individuals (see Nussbaum, 1986), meaning + = 0. We will assume more 
generally for function [2] that benefits are always greater than private costs, i.e. ( > +. 
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The values / and / respectively indicate the minimum and maximum 
number of individuals consuming  who are able to produce a relational surplus. 
Given the identifying character of a relational good, if the individuals of a 
coalition are too few ( < / or too numerous ( > /) with respect to the 
totality Θ in order to realise the relational quasi-rent, said good will determine 
only private benefits and costs (if any exist). 
 
We can describe positional goods in a similar form to [2]. Uhlaner (1989, note 
9, italics added) introduces a concept very similar to that of the positional good: 
“[i]n some circumstances persons seek to be unlike others. The analysis would 
carry through similarity if we assume relational goods in which the benefit is 
derived from dissimilarity”. In other words, a positional good is based upon the 
relationship occurring among some agents, but emerges as a response to the desire 
to distinguish oneself (rather than conform, as with relational goods). In terms of 
consumption, we can distinguish the subset of agents ! with a positive 
consumption  from the subset of agents " with a negative consumption 4– 6. In 
other words, 
(3)                                        
7 = 8
9: ∪ 
;9 <+7 
where 
9: ∩ 
;9 = 0 and ! + " = . 
Equation[3] describes the positional good – with the superscript = precisely 
indicating a positional good – as the sum of two relational goods. That is, the 
relation established among the individuals ! who positively consume a good is 
positional to the relationship established among the individuals " who exhibit a 
negative consumption of that good. 
In [3], the quasi-rent 7 can be both positive and negative. In the former case, 
the relation produces a surplus, meaning that the benefits for some (usually those 
who have a positive consumption) are greater than the losses for the others (those 
who have a negative consumption) even if the consumption has the opposite sign 
among the individuals. In the opposite situation (7 < 0), the losses are greater 
than the relational benefits. The possibility that the positional relationship could 
produce losses on the whole rather than benefits distinguishes positional goods 
from relational goods; while the latter are always assumed to produce a surplus, 
this is not necessarily true for positional goods.  
 
The characteristic function of the coalitional game 〈Θ; 〉 results in the 
following for positional goods: 
(4)                   
7 = >4/9 6 + 4/;9 6 + 7 /? 9;9 ≤ /̿4/9 6 + 4/;9 6 /? 9;9 > /̿2 
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Each of the two coalitions /9  and /;9  can develop a relational surplus on 
the inside, which is why we insert the superscript . Unlike the characteristic 
function [2], in [4] we introduce the relational outcome of joint (but negative) 
consumption: 4/;9 6. Moreover, as for relational goods, this results in a 
threshold limit value /̿ for positional goods, indicating the minimum exclusion 
level required to consume a positive quantity of a positional good. For example, 
the manifestation of an exercise of power (a typical positional good; see Pagano, 
1999; Vatiero, 2009) requires, by definition, an exclusion: such an exercise 
implies that someone else is subject to that power, namely consumes a negative 
level of power, i.e. subjection (see Pagano, 1999). 
Negotiation determines the solution of the game (e.g. core) and, except for 
problems due to coalition cyclicity,5 such a solution is Pareto-efficient.  
 
 
3. Identity in the relations 
 
There are goods with positional, relational, and private features. For example, 
consider the “consumption” of a motorbike: it determines private benefits, such as 
the driver’s (and any passengers’) transport; and private costs, such as the 
purchase price and maintenance costs.6 Moreover, it is a relational good because 
individuals who own some brand of motorbike and meet at rallies perceive 
themselves as belonging to a group with which they share a certain lifestyle (e.g. 
the so-called Guzzisti). The relational surplus depends on a joint and shared 
consumption from a plurality  < / of agents; apart from a limit superior, 
however, there is a limit inferior / below which a group identity is not perceived 
(and therefore not consumed). Finally, there is a positional component, assuming 
a status is positively consumed. This can be described as a (positional) 
juxtaposition between two coalitions. On one side we have the Guzzisti with their 
own relational outcome 4/9 6, and on the other the coalition of those who do 
not consume this type of motorbike. This second coalition can form a relational 
outcome 4/;9 6 as well; think of Harley Davidson or bicycle enthusiasts, for 
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example. In both coalitions, the formation of the relational good will depend, as in 
the previous cases, on the limits / and /. The positional surplus (or loss) 7 will 
be determined by the preferences and subsequent utilities of the individuals 
included in the two coalitions.  
 
Since positional goods can be described as a juxtaposition among relational 
goods, a motive for the formation of relational goods can therefore be their mere 
positional character. Indeed, an intrinsic feature of the relational good we have 
underlined is its identifying character: 
Loving the Beatles with other people was more fun than loving them in 
solitude. Dedicated football fans gather before games and hold cookouts, 
drink beer, talk sports, hug each other, and catch up on personal news and 
gossip. Before a game, an NFL stadium parking lot radiates an air of intense 
bonding and sharing. Fans drive hundreds of miles to partake in these 
pregame gatherings, which are often a bigger attraction than the game itself. 
(Cowen 2000,p. 3, italics in the original text) 
Excluding the private benefits that can be derived from the consumption of such 
goods, it is certain that the basis of consumption by these individuals is the 
relational good – sharing a preference for a music genre, supporting a team, etc. 
We must highlight, moreover, that these relational goods also have a positional 
nature: individuals who consume them confront individuals who consume “rival” 
relational goods (e.g. the fans of the Rolling Stones or the supporters of a rival 
team). 
 
The identifying character can concern a small group, a community, a nation, or 
a wider population. Inside the reference group, individuals can develop a 
multiplicity of consumption sharing. Outside the reference group, this 
consumption can be seen as positional.7 The point lies in understanding if and 
when the positional motivations can increase at the expense of their relational 
counterparts. Veblen (1899) affirms that if the reference group is compact and its 
members are deeply familiar with one other, then leisure and consumption 
demonstrate wealth and social status without the necessity of showing them off. 
Meanwhile, conspicuous consumption becomes relevant in communities of 
strangers and/or “casual observers” (Veblen, 1899). Following Veblen’s 
argument, the positional characteristics – flashy and conspicuous consumption –
increase as cohesion among individuals decreases; while this cohesion reduces the 
conspicuous and positional characteristics, it is also the basis of the formation of 
the relational goods. Greater (lower) social cohesion can thus increase (reduce) 
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the reasons for the relational consumption of a good rather than those for 
positional consumption. Consequently, the more the “anonymous” population 
grows in density and the human relationships become more numerous (but less 
intimate and more complex), the more we observe an elaboration and selection 
process that boosts the development of new conspicuous methods.What emerges 
is the need to participate in large meetings with people who know nothing of our 
daily lives in places such as churches, theatres, parks, and so on. In such places, if 
it is true that relational goods will develop, it is also true that positional goods will 
do the same. Veblen (1899), for example, dwells at length upon places such as 
churches to highlight the ceremonial character of the functions and thus describe a 
certain degree of conspicuity in the participants.  
 
 
4. Property rights and the relational/positional treadmill 
 
Positional goods tend to be very exclusive; as Cowen writes (2000, p. 22, 
italics added):  
[s]uccessful fan networks produce status for their fans as well as for the star. 
Exclusivist fans try to project images as non-conformists, hope to validate 
their self-esteem by being different, or simply wish to avoid the crowds 
associated with patronizing the truly famous. Fan networks do not usually 
try to include everybody, but instead exclude some individuals and portray 
them as outsiders. 
Granting a limited run of a good or artificially reducing access to its consumption 
makes a good rare, and therefore distinct. In this sense, it can be useful to evaluate 
the introduction of property rights and the characteristic of exclusion that derives 
from it. Private property reinforces exclusion from consumption and increases, 
according to Veblen (1899), antagonistic distinction among individuals (and/or 
social classes). The consumption of positional goods is therefore more marked in 
the presence of private property. Conversely, their anti-rivalrous character causes 
relational goods to lose value if there are excluding mechanisms such as property 
rights8 because joint consumption becomes more viscous.  
 
Borrowing a metaphor from an interesting book by Stefano Bartolini (2010), 
introductions of property rights on relational goods can be described as a 
(relational) treadmill. Such introductions aim to (artificially) make a relational 
good excludable for some individuals; doing so, however, reduces not only the 
well-being of those who are excluded, but also the benefit enjoyed by those 
consuming the good. Moreover, establishing property rights on such goods will 
most likely generate an exchange price – or at least an access price – that agents 
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could pay by increasing their working hours and reducing their leisure time, 
which is precisely the time most suitable for consuming relational goods. 
Therefore, even if individuals can purchase relational goods, they do so at the 
expense of the consumption of these same goods due to their decreased leisure 
time (cf. Bartolini, 2010).  
 
Meanwhile, there is also the positional treadmill. If more resources are spent in 
positional competition by all of the individuals involved, their own relative 
positions will not vary. Unlike Darwinists such as Veblen, who describes 
positional competition as a mere competition for rank superiority and basically 
one that does not satisfy material needs9, economists such as Cowen have 
criticised this statement and interpreted positional competition as a competition to 
obtain more plentiful means to fulfil one’s own needs and achieve positive effects. 
Cowen (2000, p. 102) writes about the search for celebrity (a typical positional 
competition): “[t]he concentration of artistic achievements in particular points of 
space and time (Periclean Athens, the Florentine Renaissance, the Parisian Art 
World) reflects the fact that competition promotes rather than discourages star 
efforts” (p. 128). In greater detail (p. 119): 
Rivalries often produce fame for both parties to the contest, rather than 
merely redistributing fame, as the zero-sum view would suggest. The duel of 
Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa sparked great interest, as the two battled 
for single-season home run supremacy. Carl Lewis and Ben Johnson became 
the two most prominent track runners of the late twentieth century through 
their repeated confrontations. Magic Johnson and Larry Bird increased their 
renown through their basketball rivalry in the 1980s. Muhammad Ali owes 
part of his fame to having had the opportunity to fight Sonny Liston, Joe 
Frazier, and George Foreman, all worthy opponents 
In this regard, it is plausible that the athletes named by Cowen enjoyed a certain 
celebrity merely because of engrossing (positional) “competition” with rivals of 
similar skill; but, as Cowen reminds us, celebrity is a rare good, meaning someone 
– by definition – must have suffered for the celebrity of these athletes. Therefore, 
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in response to Cowen, we need to extend the reference population to include the 
“losers”: for example, McGwire and Sosa both surpassed the single-season home 
run record held by Roger Maris. With this extension, we return once again to a 
zero-sum game perspective with winners and losers, which justifies the 
description of the positional competition as a treadmill – particularly with the 
introduction of excluding mechanisms such as property rights. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
     Relational goods and positional goods widen the traditional categories of 
economic goods. Both typologies are based on social interactions within a group, 
among groups, or, using Veblen’s terminology, within a social class or among 
social classes. Relational goods imply an identifying character among individuals 
who are involved in their consumption. However, such a group characteristic has, 
like every other identity, a positional component vis-à-vis other groups. 
Analogously, except in a two-agent context, every positional good always has a 
relational component, as well. 
This close interconnection between relational and positional goods is related to 
the sociality conditions on which both are based as economic goods. What 
emerges is a complex structure of interactions and relationships among 
individuals within a group or among groups that are able to produce an economic 
outcome; such an outcome would be ignored by standard analyses bound to the 
single categories of private goods versus public goods. 
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Summary: A Joint Reading of Positional and Relational Goods. (J.E.L. D11, K00) 
 
Both relational and positional goods are based upon an idea of joint 
consumption – though with opposite signs. Indeed, in both cases, individuals’ 
consumption choices take into account not only the individuals themselves, but 
others, as well. Given that relational goods provide a form of identity to their 
consumers, we show that a certain degree of positionality emerges within the 
consumption of relational goods. Analogously, except in a two-agent context, 
each positional good also has a relational component. What emerges is a complex 
structure of economic outcomes based on both relational and positional motives. 
 
L’idea di consumo congiunto è alla base della definizione sia dei beni 
relazionali sia dei beni posizionali, sebbene nei due casi tale consumo abbia segno 
opposto. Infatti per entrambe le tipologie di bene economico le scelte di consumo 
sono other-regarded piuttosto che auto-interessate. Dato che il bene relazionale 
prevede un’identità tra i suoi consumatori, si mostra che un certo grado di 
posizionalità emerge anche nel consumo del bene relazionale. Parimenti, in 
contesti con più di due agenti, ogni bene posizionale ha anche una componente 
12 
 
relazionale. Ne risulta una complessa struttura di outcome economici derivanti sia 
da ragioni relazionali sia da ragioni posizionali.  
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